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A primary assumption of this paper is that Friedrich Nietzsche’s texts—in 
particular The Birth of Tragedy and Thus Spoke Zarathustra—employ artistic 
metaphors in order (among other purposes, of course) to demonstrate the human 
being’s fundamental relationship with life and earth.  Based upon that premise, I 
shall argue that Nietzsche’s experience of the thought of the eternal recurrence 
brings about a shift in his understanding of life and earth, and that the figure of the 
dancer in Thus Spoke Zarathustra serves as a metaphor for the highest mode of 
human life-activity in light of that shift. 
 
I. Introduction: “I would believe only in a god who could dance.”1 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy (1871) and Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra (1883-1884) are full of metaphors, aphorisms, and parables which 
suggest that human existence is and ought to be an artistic practice—i.e. that for 
human beings, the very act of living is an act of artistic creation.  In The Birth of 
Tragedy, we find that the life forces characterized by the gods Apollo and 
Dionysus are artistic impulses which belong to “nature herself”2 and which find 
their outlet in human artistic creation: from the Apollinian issues idealized 
sculpture; from the Dionysian, orgiastic music; and from the union of the two, 
tragedy.  Through these forms of art, which spring out of “nature herself,” human 
beings express their relationship to life and to the earth.  The Apollinian sculptor 
fixes for eternity the beautiful forms that are revealed to him in his dreams: “the 
higher truth, the perfection of these states in contrast to the incompletely 
intelligible every day world, this deep consciousness of nature…make life possible 
                                                 
1 TSZ.I, “On Reading and Writing,” p. 153 
2 The Birth of Tragedy (Hereafter BT), §2, p. 38  
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and worth living.”3  In opposition to the Apollinian exaltation of form and of 
measured, ordered beauty, is the figure of the Dionysian reveler.  In the throes of 
Dionysian ecstasy, one surrenders one’s will to the experience of what Nietzsche 
refers to as a “primal unity,” which reveals itself in the frenzied singing and 
dancing of the reveler:   
Under the charm of the Dionysian not only is the union between man 
and man reaffirmed, but nature which has become alienated, hostile, 
or subjugated, celebrates once more her reconciliation with her lost 
son, man…In song and in dance man expresses himself as a member 
of a higher community….  He is no longer an artist, he has become a 
work of art: in these paroxysms of intoxication the artistic power of all 
nature reveals itself.4 
 
Finally, when the primal ecstasy of Dionysus is channeled through the Apollinian 
capacity for ordered illusion, the result is Greek tragedy, which Nietzsche lauds as 
the highest achievement of human art. 
In each of these fundamental art forms—sculpture, music, and tragedy—
human beings express their relationship with each other—and more importantly for 
my purposes, their relationship to life and to the earth.  The questions of precisely 
what Nietzsche means by “life” and “earth” are not easily solved—or even 
approached—but I think that we can at least say with some confidence that there is 
a shift in the meaning of these concepts between The Birth of Tragedy and Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra.  We might say very simply that in The Birth of Tragedy, “life” 
is characterized as a “primal unity” which expresses itself in the actions of—and 
relations between—particular creatures, and the “earth” is the site—and perhaps 
also the material—of life’s perpetual artistic creation.  Although these basic 
characterizations seem also to hold true of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, a subtle but 
crucial shift has taken place, because in that later work, “life” and “earth” must be 
understood in light of Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal recurrence.5   
The eternal recurrence is a highly complicated concept which will become 
clearer in the following discussion.  Nevertheless, it will be helpful to begin with at 
least a preliminary understanding of it.  In its most basic form—which I present in 
an admittedly simplified manner—Nietzsche’s “eternal recurrence” refers to a new 
                                                 
3 BT, §1, p. 35 
4 BT, §1, p. 37 
5 See Beyond Good and Evil, §56, p. 258.  There, in a manner which accords quite well with the characterization of 
human activi ty as an aesthetically sensitive response to the cyclical movement of life and earth which I shall offer 
below, Nietzsche alludes to the eternal recurrence in musical terms, speaking of a “world-affirming human being 
who has not only come to terms and learned to get along with whatever was and is, but who wants to have what was 
and is repeated into all eternity, shouting insatiably da capo….”  (NB: “da capo” is a musical direction which means 
“from the beginning.”) 
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understanding of temporality according to which time moves, not in a straight line, 
but rather in a cyclical fashion.  What I wish to demonstrate is that this new 
conception of time results in a correspondingly new understanding of the concept 
of “life.”  Whereas the conception of “life” exemplified in Nietzsche’s earlier text, 
The Birth of Tragedy, seems to refer to the generally linear process of nature’s 
perpetual striving and unfolding through artistic creation, that linear temporality 
has been made to “bite its own tail,” to turn back upon itself, in the eternal 
recurrence.  Therefore, life is no longer a linear progression, but rather an eternal 
repetition 6  which is also at every moment a complete expression of itself.  
Similarly, the notion of the “earth” must now be understood differently—if only in 
that it is now the site of a process, not of perpetual unfolding toward the future, but 
of recurrence, wherein past and future are mutually implicated in the present 
moment. 
Given that the notions of “life” and “earth” (of which I have offered only 
rough characterizations, but will discuss in more detail below) have undergone a 
fundamental shift resulting from Nietzsche’s “discovery” 7  of the eternal 
recurrence, it is not surprising that the artistic metaphors used to describe human 
conduct should also change radically in light of that idea, which is at once a new 
temporality and, as I shall argue, the framework of a new morality.  In fact, 
Nietzsche himself presents the notion of the eternal recurrence as an idea which 
necessitates a new form of moral agency:  
If this thought gained possession of you, it would change you, as you 
are, or perhaps crush you.  The question in each and every thing, ‘Do 
you want this once more and innumerable times more?’ would weigh 
upon your actions as the greatest weight.8   
 
In this paper I shall argue that the notion of art as a primordial expression of 
our fundamental relation to the earth and to life is carried over into Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, and ultimately, that dance in particular reveals itself as the 
fundamental form which this relationship takes in light of the thought of the eternal 
recurrence.  I have two primary reasons for making this claim: first, as I have 
indicated, I understand the experience of the thought of the eternal recurrence as an 
experience with unavoidable moral implications.  In other words, the experience of 
                                                 
6 See Deleuze (1977) and my notes below on that essay. 
7 In his autobiographical work, Ecce Homo, Nietzsche describes the eternal recurrence as a thought which he did not 
invent, but rather received or discovered.  See p. 751: “It was then that this idea came to me .” (emphasis added)  
Also, p. 756: “…suddenly, with indescribably certainty and subtlety, something becomes visible, audible, something 
that shakes one to the last depths and throws one down…One hears, one does not seek; one accepts, one does not 
ask who gives; like lightning, a thought flashes up, with necessity, without hesitation regarding its form—I never 
had any choice.”  
8 The Gay Science, §341, p. 274 
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this thought must bring about a new relationship with life and the earth.  As we 
know, Zarathustra (and indeed Nietzsche himself) has had the experience of 
receiving this “most abysmal thought,” 9 and his task—arguably—is to prepare 
humankind to receive it.   
The second reason for my suggestion of the central importance of dance is 
that the artistic images and metaphors presented by Nietzsche have themselves 
undergone a shift in emphasis.  Whereas The Birth of Tragedy, obviously, focused 
on the union of the Dionysian and Apollinian art impulses in the Greek tragic 
theater (and on the subsequent death of tragedy in the wake of the critical 
rationality of Socrates),  in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, tragedy—indeed writing and 
drama in general, apart from a few brief references—have largely disappeared 
from Nietzsche’s discussion and have been replaced primarily by metaphors of 
song and dance.10  I do not believe that this shift in language is accidental, nor the 
result of stylistic whim; on the contrary, it is quite significant, and I believe it 
supports my thesis that the human being’s fundamental relationship to life and 
earth—in light of the new temporality and morality brought about by Nietzsche’s 
epiphany—is best represented by metaphors of dance. 
 
II. Zarathustra’s Virtue: Earth, Life, Body 
In the speech11 entitled “On the Gift-Giving Virtue,” Zarathustra counsels 
his disciples: “Remain faithful to the earth with the power of your virtue…Lead 
back to the earth the virtue that flew away…—back to the body, back to life, that it 
may give the earth a meaning, a human meaning.”12  There are several elements of 
Zarathustra’s command which deserve close attention, and which will dominate 
this section of my discussion: “back to the earth,” “back to life,” “back to the 
body.”  Given that my interest in this paper deals specifically with the 
metaphorical significance of dance—a bodily activity—clearly we must seek to 
understand Zarathustra’s claim that virtue must be returned to the body.  But in 
order to do this, we must first consider the other two highlighted aspects of 
Zarathustra’s command—“back to the earth” and “back to life”—because, as I will 
argue below, I believe that the virtue of the body lies in its responsiveness and 
attunement to life and earth. 
                                                 
9 Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Hereafter TSZ).III, “The Convalescent, §1,” p. 328 
10 Recall the passage from Beyond Good and Evil (§56, p. 258), in which the eternal recurrence is characterized as a 
“da capo.”  See my note 5 on p. 2, above. 
One might object here that tragedy itself is rooted in the song and dance of the chorus, and therefore that my claim 
regarding the shift in artistic metaphors is overstated.  However, I think it is still fair to say that metaphors of song 
and dance are more explicitly present in Thus Spoke Zarathustra than in The Birth of Tragedy. 
11 Thus Spoke Zarathustra consists primarily of a series of speeches by Nietzsche’s fictional character, Zarathustra.  
Therefore most of my references to the text will be references to one or more “speech(es).” 
12 TSZ.I, “On the Gift-Giving Virtue,” §2, p. 188 
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As I have said, the notions of “life” and “earth” have undergone a radical 
transformation in Thus Spoke Zarathustra as a result of Nietzsche’s experience of 
the thought of the eternal recurrence, and this transformation marks a shift away 
from both traditional (meta)physical understandings and from Nietzsche’s earlier 
views in The Birth of Tragedy.  I will discuss “life” and “earth” jointly, because I 
believe that the two notions are ultimately inseparable in Nietzsche and cannot be 
adequately discussed independent of each other. 
 
 
A. Life and Earth 
We are advised to return our virtue to the “earth.”  But this does not only 
mean that we must cut ourselves loose from all afterworldly chains which hold us 
paralyzed, waiting passively for a truth and a justification of life from beyond.  Of 
course, as we know, so much is true: Zarathustra certainly means to free us from 
metaphysics and from religious devotion. Note, for example, his refusal to become 
an object of worship for his disciples.13  However, he also intends something more 
than this—something more specific—for he does not simply tell us that we must 
lead our virtue away from heaven; rather we are told precisely to lead our virtue 
back to the earth.  That is, our virtue will not only be cut free from the beyond, but 
it will in some sense derive from the earth itself.  In leading our virtue back to the 
earth, we also allow ourselves to be led by the earth—in other words, our existence 
must somehow receive its principles and inspiration from the earth.14  As I shall 
argue below, this sensitivity to the earth will culminate in the form of affectivity 
exemplified by the dancer.  
The notion of “earth” for which Zarathustra is preparing his disciples is of 
course vastly different from that to which they have been previously accustomed.  
Prior to our escape from afterworldly hopes and metaphysical bondage, the earth is 
disparaged as the less-than-heaven.  But for Zarathustra, the “earth” is the site of 
the eternal recurrence, the temporal movement by which life cuts into itself and 
overcomes itself.  (Note the intertwining of life and earth in this definition.)  The 
earth is the site of perpetual birth, death, and rebirth—but, as Zarathustra counsels 
us, we ought not to look upon this movement of life and death with despair.  
                                                 
13 See TSZ.I, “On the Gift-Giving Virtue,” §3, p. 190: “Now I go alone, my disciples.  You too go now, alone.  Thus 
I want it.  Verily, I counsel you: go away from me and resist Zarathustra!  And even better: be ashamed of him!  
Perhaps he deceived you…You revere me; but what if your reverence tumbles one day?  Beware lest a statue slay 
you.  You say you believe in Zarathustra?  But what matters Zarathustra.  You are my believers—but what matter all 
believers?  You had not yet sought yourselves: and you found me.  Thus do all believers; therefore all faith amounts 
to so little.” 
14 As I will demonstrate below, the “voluntary beggar” has attempted to follow Zarathustra’s teaching “back to the 
earth,” but he has not succeeded.  The manner and cause of his failure, as we shall see, lie in direct contrast to the 
mode of existence exemplified by the dancer. 
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Gripped by what Zarathustra calls his “devil, the spirit of gravity,” we are 
accustomed to regard life with pious solemnity and to seek our own preservation at 
all costs, all the while clinging to our hopes for redemption in the beyond.  For the 
one who has not yet “become light,” “the earth and life seem grave” 15: they take an 
inordinate seriousness.  The grave spirit clings fearfully to life, regarding death as 
the greatest loss—despite the priests’ reminders to look forward to death as the 
release from the suffering of life. 
According to Nietzsche, both the pious, grave spirits—with their rejection of 
death—and the priests—with their rejection of life—are misguided: for each in 
their own way impoverish life by holding it separate from death.  Rather, it is the 
very going-under16 of life which is the necessary condition for life.  Life is only 
possible if it cuts into itself, if it enters into the eternal cycle of living and dying, 
and for Zarathustra, the best life is that which wills its own going-under: “I love 
those who do not know how to live, except by going under, for they are those who 
cross over…I love him who loves his virtue, for virtue is the will to go under.”17  
To overcome both our ambivalent fear of death and our denial of life is to 
overcome the spirit of gravity and to open ourselves to the true joy of earthly life. 
The earth, I have suggested, is best to be understood as the site of the eternal 
recurrence.  It is the space in which life cuts into itself, and in which all will to life 
is also the will to go under, to perish.  Therefore, I believe we are justified in 
saying that the earth itself is implicated in the eternal recurrence—not simply in the 
naïve sense, that the plants and animals and physical objects of the earth grow and 
decay, but rather in a stronger sense: that the earth itself, as the site of all action 
and life, undergoes its own overcoming.  Indeed in a prophecy mentioned in the 
section entitled “On Old and New Tablets,” Zarathustra describes the world as 
“fleeing back to itself—as an eternal fleeing and seeking each other again of many 
gods.”18 
I would like to say that the earth is the “ground” of life—and I will explain 
what I mean by this, for this phrase requires clarification.  Indeed, one might object 
that such a description grants the earth a stability which is not valid within 
Nietzsche’s thinking.  But I believe that I am justified in saying that the earth is 
indeed a “ground,” not only in the naïve sense, and also not in the traditional 
metaphysical sense of stability and certainty.  Clearly, the site of a perpetual cycle 
of self-overcoming could not be regarded as stable.  Indeed, many readers of 
Nietzsche assert that for Nietzsche, life has no real ground, suggesting instead that 
                                                 
15 TSZ.III, “On the Spirit of Gravity, §1” p. 304 
16 The German word Untergehen plays a significant role in TSZ, and I shall make frequent use of the English 
rendering “going under.” 
17 TSZ.I, “Prologue,” p. 127 
18 TSZ.III, “On Old and New Tablets,” §2, p. 309 
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beneath the phenomenal world there is only an abyss.19  And one can find in 
Nietzsche’s texts—particularly of The Birth of Tragedy—the suggestion that life is 
in a sense groundless.  One might point in particular to the end of Section 7 of that 
work, where the Dionysian man who has “looked truly into the essence of 
things…sees everywhere only the horror and absurdity of existence.”20  If life is 
groundless, and if the earth is the site of life, it would seem that the earth itself 
could only be regarded as an “abysmally deep ground”21—or as no ground at all.  
But in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, life is not groundless, although we see that such a 
conclusion is tempting even to Zarathustra himself, of whom a great effort is 
required in order to overcome the soothsayer’s prophecy that “all is empty.”22  I 
believe that Zarathustra’s command to return virtue to the earth, along with his 
overcoming of nausea and the soothsayer’s nihilism, represents a declaration that 
life does indeed have a ground and is indeed justified: life justifies itself by virtue 
of its rootedness in the earth—the earth, not simply as the physical earth, but rather 
as the ground of life. 
As the ground of life, the earth contains within itself the weight of life and of 
the past.  It carries the density accumulated by the eternal movement of life.  In 
undergoing—and subsequently overcoming—nausea and nihilism, Zarathustra 
takes on the weight of the past and simultaneously gives a basis to life: life is not 
groundless; it is grounded in its own self-overcoming.  Life is not, then, a perpetual 
creation ex nihilo; nor can the past bind Zarathustra.  I would rather plot for the 
“ground” a middle course between stability and nothingness, for as Zarathustra 
asks his disciples: “must there not be that over which one dances and dances 
away?”23  The ground of history and traditional morality against which Zarathustra 
the dancer24 thrusts is certainly not a nothingness.  And as we know, the child—the 
third stage of Zarathustra’s metamorphosis—cannot exist on its own.  There can be 
no forgetting, no free relation to past and future without the camel—i.e. without 
the willingness to take upon one’s back the weight of the past. 25  The key to 
                                                 
19 See, for example, Lingis (1977). 
20 BT, §7, p. 60 
21 Beyond Good and Evil, §289, p. 419 
22 TSZ.II, “The Soothsayer,” p. 245 
23 TSZ.III, “On the Old and New Tablets,” §2, p. 309 
24 As I shall mention below, Zarathustra himself is often portrayed as a dancer: for this reason, I will at times use 
masculine pronouns in my discussion of the dancer. 
25 For those who are not familiar with Nietzsche’s parable of “The Three Metamorphoses” of the spirit, I provide the 
following (highly abridged) summary, for we shall see that the theme of the metamorphoses plays a significant role 
both in TSZ and in my paper.  In order for the human spirit to become a creator of new values—which is the 
ostensible purpose of the narrative of TSZ—it must undergo a series of changes which Zarathustra presents in 
metaphorical fashion.  First, Zarathustra says, the spirit must become a camel, a beast of burden: the camel willfully 
submits to the burden which is placed upon its back.  In this phase, the human spirit takes upon itself the burden of 
the past and, in a sense, makes itself responsible for the whole of human history.  In the second metamorphosis, the 
spirit must become a lion: in this phase, the spirit rages against the ossified rules of tradition and breaks the stone 
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understanding Zarathustra’s maxim that the only redemption for mankind will be 
in the recreation of all “it was” into “thus I willed it”26 lies in recognizing that the 
weight of the past is real, but not stable.  With this recognition, we arrive at a 
proper conception of the “earth” as a “ground”: it is a foundation which has real 
weight and density, but which is not stable, but rather constantly shifting and 
turning over upon itself.  In this notion of ground, the earth and the past are 
intertwined, and both must be constantly overcome in the movement of life.  The 
dancer, who “has his ear in his toes,”27 as Zarathustra says, is attuned to the 
turbulent, uneven density of the earth and the movement of life. 
With all the references to dance in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, it should come 
as little surprise that at times Nietzsche presents Zarathustra himself as a dancer—
perhaps most significantly in Part 3’s “The Other Dancing Song.”  Zarathustra’s 
song relates to us the story of his dance with Life, and as the song tells us, Life 
incites Zarathustra to dance precisely by dancing herself, leaping away from 
Zarathustra, only to leap back to him when he retreats.  I do not wish to dwell at 
any great length on this passage, but it is crucial to note that Zarathustra’s dancing 
is attuned, responsive, to the movement and character of Life.  Life leaps away 
from Zarathustra and then toward him again, in a circular pattern of flight and 
return, and Zarathustra mirrors those movements, engaging himself in a playful 
relation to Life.  What I would like to highlight is the manner in which the cyclical, 
rhythmic movement of Zarathustra’s dance offers itself as a response to the 
movement of Life.  (Recall Zarathustra’s prophecy, in which the world is similarly 
described as a “fleeing and seeking again.”)  Here Life itself is presented as 
dancing, moving in what I have described as a circular pattern of flight and return.  
I want to thematize this metaphorical presentation and to suggest that Life’s dance 
here is precisely its willful entry into the eternal recurrence.  As Zarathustra 
teaches in his speech “On the Tarantulas,” “life must overcome itself again and 
again…Life wants to climb and to overcome itself climbing.” 28   As I have 
mentioned above, life’s overcoming of itself is the condition for life.  Life must 
will its own going-under that it might reach for something higher than itself.  
Zarathustra’s dance mirrors life’s dance and the earth’s dance, as does his will to 
self-overcoming. 
                                                                                                                                                             
tablets of traditional morality.  By effecting this break with the burden of the past, the lion frees itself from the 
constraints of tradition.  But, as Zarathustra points out, the lion cannot yet create new values.  In order to do so, the 
spirit must undergo the final metamorphosis: it must become a child.  Only when it has become a child is the spirit 
able to see things anew, unfettered by the rigid distinctions and principles which have grown stale, and thus to create 
new values.  For a fuller presentation of the preceding movement, see TSZ.I, “On the Three Metamorphoses,” pp. 
137-140. 
26 TSZ.II, “On Redemption,” p. 251 
27 TSZ.III, “The Other Dancing Song,” §1, p. 336 
28 TSZ.II, “On the Tarantulas,” p. 213 
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With this understanding of life and earth, let us recall that Zarathustra also 
urges us to return our virtue to the body.  As we shall see, it is precisely through 
the sensitivity and agency of his body that Zarathustra—as the dancer—is able to 
attune his activity to that of life and earth.  Let us now consider the movements of 
the dancer, so that the analogy with life and earth—which has, I hope, begun to 
become evident—might be made more explicit.   
B. Body 
The dancer (Zarathustra) begins on the ground, his weight is borne fully by 
the earth, and he is sensitive to the density and contours of the earth—in touch with 
it.  “The dancer has his ear in his toes.”29  His movements, his conduct, will be 
derived from those of the earth and life.  Alluding briefly to Zarathustra’s “On the 
Three Metamorphoses,” we might here draw a parallel to the camel, which takes 
the weight and burden of the past and tradition upon itself.  By acknowledging and 
celebrating his intimate contact with the earth, the dancer in a sense takes upon 
himself the responsibility for the earth.  He makes the weight of the earth his own. 
30  But Zarathustra the dancer does not remain on the earth.  He thrusts against the 
earth with all the strength of his will, breaking the hold which the earth and the 
spirit of gravity have had upon him.  He has now taken on the character of the 
lion—the frenzied breaking of the rigidified tablets of morality, the overcoming of 
his own clinging to the preservation of life.31  Finally, having thrust against the 
weight of the earth, he leaps into the air in a gesture which is at once pure kinetic 
freedom and creative morality.  He has become the child, free to act and create 
anew, unbound by the past.32  As Nietzsche writes, “the child is innocence and 
forgetting, a new beginning…a sacred ‘Yes.’” 33   Free from the ground, the 
dancer’s very movement is an act of creativity.  But let us be careful not to see in 
the Zarathustrian dancer’s activity the chaotic, unbridled frenzy of the Dionysian 
reveler.  Rather, his movements, although no longer dictated by the ground, are a 
response to the ground; they arise precisely out of the dancer’s sensitivity to the 
earth. 34 
                                                 
29 TSZ.III, “The Other Dancing Song,” §1, p. 336 
30 We might also point out that Zarathustra performs the camel’s task in the early parts of TSZ.  For a fuller account 
of the way in which the character and text of Zarathustra themselves enact the three metamorphoses, see Gooding-
Williams (1990). 
31 Zarathustra carries out this task in the middle of TSZ, when he confronts the stagnant solidity of traditional 
morality.   
32 Zarathustra assumes the figure of the child (especially) in Part III.  
33 TSZ.I, “On the Three Metamorphoses,” p. 139 
34 The difference between the two dancing figures of Zarathustra and Dionysus will be examined below.  While one 
might object that the Dionysian reveler also dances due to her sensitivity to life and earth, I shall argue below that 
the particular modes of affectivity and agency exemplified by the Dionysian dancer are inferior to those of the 
Zarathustrian dancer. 
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Of course the dancer does not simply remain in the air, floating above the 
earth, cut loose from the ground of history and morality.  Every leap into the air is 
followed by a return to the earth: the cycle is resumed.  It is in this sense that 
Zarathustra’s dancing mirrors the movement of the eternal recurrence.  The 
dancer’s creative, expressive virtue takes its cues from the movement of life and 
earth in the eternal recurrence.  As Zarathustra asks in “The Seven Seals (Or: The 
Yes and Amen Song),” “If my virtue is a dancer’s virtue…how should I not lust 
after eternity and…the ring of recurrence?”35 
We are now in a position to reformulate the original question of this paper 
by asking: “What is a dancer’s virtue?”  I believe we can answer this question by 
saying that, for Zarathustra, the dancer’s virtue lies in her peculiar modes of 
affectivity and agency.  This conclusion has begun, I hope, to become apparent in 
the preceding discussion, but it still requires elucidation and justification.  In order 
to arrive at a clearer picture of the affectivity and agency of the dancer in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, let us compare the Zarathustrian dancer to another dancing 
figure which plays a significant role in Nietzsche’s thinking: the Dionysian reveler.  
By identifying certain crucial differences between the Zarathustrian and Dionysian 
dancers, we will begin to see quite clearly the way in which the dancer in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra emerges as the paradigmatic expression of human virtue in light 
of the eternal recurrence. 
 
III. Body Continued: Dionysus and Zarathustra 
It is wise, I think, to broaden our consideration of the dancer somewhat, for 
of course, metaphors of dance in Nietzsche’s works are not exclusive to Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra.36  Indeed, in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche makes several 
references to dance, which he pairs with music under the heading of Dionysian art.  
But as I shall argue, Dionysian and Zarathustrian dance are substantially different 
modes of activity, and the difference between these two types of dance corresponds 
to the evolution of Nietzsche’s understanding of life and earth, which as I have 
said, is altered by his experience of the eternal recurrence.  Let us now examine the 
shift in Nietzsche’s characterizations of dance between The Birth of Tragedy and 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, so that we might further illuminate the significance of 
dance in the latter text. 
In The Birth of Tragedy, song and dance are offered as exemplars of 
Dionysian art.  Gripped by the energy of a primitive life force, the Dionysian 
reveler experiences what Nietzsche calls the “primal unity” of all life—the chaotic 
                                                 
35 TSZ, III, “The Seven Seals (Or: The Yes and Amen Song),” §6, pp. 342-343 
36 See, for example, The Gay Science, §381: “I would not know what the spirit of a philosopher might wish more to 
be than a good dancer.  For the dance is his ideal, also his art, and finally also his only piety, his ‘service of God.’” 
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oneness which underlies all particularity prior to the discriminating and 
individuating power of Apollo:  
In song and dance man expresses himself as a member of a higher 
community; he has forgotten how to walk and speak and is on the way 
toward flying into the air, dancing…he feels himself a god, he himself 
now walks about enchanted, in ecstasy, like the gods he saw walking 
in his dreams.37 
 
The experience of Dionysian revelry, as I have suggested, is analogous to 
the activity of the dancer in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, but there is a significant 
difference between the two.  The analogy, which I presented provisionally at the 
beginning of this paper, lies in the fact that Dionysian song and dance on the one 
hand, and Zarathustrian dance on the other, each represent for Nietzsche, at 
different points in his thinking, the human being’s most intimate contact with life 
and earth.  Let us now extend the analogy and say that in each case, this 
relationship is characterized by specific forms of agency and affectivity.  It is 
precisely in their differing modes of agency and affectivity that Dionysian and 
Zarathustrian dance differ—both as forms of art and, more significantly, as 
expressions of the human being’s fundamental relationship to life and earth.  Allow 
me now to elucidate what I mean by these claims about agency and affectivity. 
In The Birth of Tragedy, the human being’s relationship to life and earth is 
not characterized in terms of individual agency or will, but rather as a sort of 
mystical possession.  The reveler does not willfully enact or express, but rather 
receives, the experience of the Dionysian primal unity; although she may indeed 
drink wine or perform certain rites—or, indeed, go to the theater!—in order to 
invoke the spirit of Dionysus, ultimately she can only make herself ready to be 
overtaken.  The reveler is receptive, but in a wholly passive way. Nietzsche writes, 
she “is no longer an artist, [s]he has become a work of art: in these paroxysms of 
intoxication the artistic power of all nature reveals itself.”38  It is not the reveler, 
but rather the “power of nature”—i.e. of life and earth—that expresses itself; the 
dancer is but the instrument of the Dionysian life force.  She is the work of art, not 
the artist. 
On the contrary, the metaphors of dance in Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
demonstrate new modes of agency and affectivity which express the human 
being’s new relationship to life and earth.  As I have said, the notions of life and 
earth have undergone a fundamental shift based upon Nietzsche’s experience of the 
thought of the eternal recurrence.  Life and earth themselves have entered willfully 
                                                 
37 BT, §1, p. 37 
38BT, §1, p. 37 (emphasis added) 
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into the eternal cycle of becoming, 39  and human activity must enact a 
corresponding evolution.  In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the dancer is not possessed 
by a life force, but rather attunes herself to the movement of life and earth in the 
eternal recurrence.  The Zarathustrian dancer is still characterized by her 
affectivity, but her affectivity is of a much different sort than that of the Dionysian 
dancer. 
The Zarathustrian dancer’s affectivity—unlike the pure passivity of the 
Dionysian reveler, which requires the agency of a primal life force—is 
characterized by her willful submission to life and earth.  The Dionysian reveler 
too submits to life, but she does so with the aim of rendering herself a mere 
instrument of life’s activity.  Life as primal unity—strictly speaking—is the agent; 
the Dionysian dancer is only the medium through which life expresses itself.  
Activity and passivity are strictly divided: “life” is the active force, and the reveler 
is passively employed by life’s self-expressive impulses. 
This is not true of the Zarathustrian dancer.  Whereas in The Birth of 
Tragedy, the reveler ceases to be an agent to the extent that her body and will are 
commandeered by the artistic impulses of life itself, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the 
dancer expresses a new form of agency—an agency which contains within itself a 
certain affectivity.  Affectivity and agency are intertwined in a unique way in the 
figure of the Zarathustrian dancer, for she is neither wholly passive nor wholly 
active.  Rather, her activity and passivity are united, and they are united precisely 
in her body.  Her body is attuned to the movements of life and earth and she 
actively—i.e. willfully—perceives the movements of life and earth in the eternal 
recurrence, with the express purpose of mimicking and responding to those 
movements.  Like the camel, the Zarathustrian dancer willfully assumes 
responsibility for the earth.  Aware of the intimate contact between her body and 
the earth, the dancer draws her guidance from the movement of life and earth in the 
eternal recurrence and willfully submits to the cycle of becoming. 
The virtue of the dancer, then, is rooted in a particular mode of bodily 
existence—in a dynamic union of affectivity and agency.  Let us now examine in 
more detail one particular form of affectivity which I find to be especially crucial, 
so that we might see more clearly the way in which the dancer’s mode of existence 
emerges as superior to that which Zarathustra finds among mankind hitherto—
                                                 
39 My characterization of the eternal recurrence as a movement of pure becoming, rather than the repetition of 
identical events, owes much to Deleuze (1977): “We misconstrue the expression ‘eternal return’ when we take it as 
the return of the same.  It is not being that recurs, but, rather, that recurrence itself constitutes being insofar as it 
affirms becoming and passing.  It is not some one thing that recurs, but that recurrence is itself affirmed by the 
passage of diversity or multiplicity.  In other words, identity in the Eternal Return does not designate the nature of 
what recurs, but, to the contrary, the fact of recurring difference…We can only understand the Eternal Return as the 
expression of a principle that serves to explain diversity and the reproduction of diversity, or difference and its 
repetition” (pp. 86-87). 
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even among the so-called “higher men.”  For, as we shall see, the shortcomings of 
the higher men are largely due to their failure to adopt the sophisticated mode of 
affectivity and agency which I find to be exemplified by the dancer. 
 
IV. “The dancer has his ear in his toes.”40 
I have been arguing that in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche advocates a 
new form of affectivity—specifically a bodily sensitivity to the movements of life 
and earth.  Contained within the call for this bodily sensitivity is also a special 
emphasis on listening—as evidenced by the passage from “The Other Dancing 
Song” which I have chosen as the title of this section and which I have quoted 
several times earlier as well.  Zarathustra frequently laments the fact that the men 
to whom he speaks are not suited to hear him.  “I am not the mouth for these ears,” 
he says.41  “The heedful ear is lacking in their limbs.”42  In order for Zarathustra 
the speaker to be effective, what is required of his students is a proper form of 
hearing, a hearing which he does not find even among the “higher men.”  For these 
higher men—despite their faithful adherence to Zarathustra’s doctrines—have 
failed to listen properly to their teacher.  They have tried to embody Zarathustra’s 
teachings, but there is something wrong with the way in which they have listened 
to him.  The problem, simply put, is that they have attempted to be guided by what 
we might call the “letter” of Zarathustra’s speeches; the higher men have listened 
too literally and too superficially to Zarathustra, and consequently they have failed 
to understand him.  Perhaps the best example is the voluntary beggar, who has 
allowed himself to be guided by the literal content of Zarathustra’s dictum, “back 
to the earth,” but has failed to grasp his teacher’s deeper meaning.  Rather than 
pursuing the only possible redemption for mankind by deriving his virtue from the 
movement of the earth in the eternal recurrence, the voluntary beggar has 
abandoned mankind altogether, electing instead to preach to cattle.43 
The kind of hearing required by Zarathustra’s speech is not a cognitive 
function through which the listener receives a concatenation of impressions which 
correspond to given ideas, and then translates those impressions into the 
meaningful expression which they were meant to represent.  In such an event of 
what I might call cognitive perception, that which is spoken is self-contained, 
external to both the speaker and the listener.  The content of the speaker’s speech 
is, in a sense, given—it is self-sufficient.  It is an idea which exists on its own and 
which can be communicated via a precise employment of vocabulary and syntax.  
Neither the speaker nor the listener is essentially implicated in it.  All that is 
                                                 
40 TSZ.III, “The Other Dancing Song,” §1, p. 336 
41 TSZ.I, “Prologue,” §5, p. 128 
42 TSZ.IV, “The Sign,” p. 437 
43 TSZ.IV, “The Voluntary Beggar,” pp. 380-384 
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required for its effective transmission is that the speaker chooses the proper words 
and that the listener is able to understand (i.e. decode) those words.  If such a 
description were true of Zarathustra’s teachings, then we would have to attribute 
the inability of Zarathustra’s disciples to understand him either to Zarathustra’s 
failure to choose the proper expression of his ideas or to the disciples’ insufficient 
linguistic abilities.  However, neither of these is the case.  Rather, the entire 
characterization of communication which I have just described is insufficient to 
account for the problem.  This understanding of communication is itself flawed, 
and it fails to encompass the kind of hearing which Zarathustra requires of his 
disciples. 
The problem with such a characterization of communication is that it relies 
upon an impoverished mode of perception, one which presupposes an external 
relationship between the perceiver and the thing perceived.  In his speech “On 
Immaculate Perception,” Zarathustra vehemently criticizes any such detached 
understanding of perception: 
“This would be the highest to my mind”—thus says your lying spirit 
to itself—“to look at life without desire and not, like a dog, with my 
tongue hanging out.  To be happy in looking, with a will that has died 
and without the grasping and greed of selfishness, the whole body 
cold and ashen, but with drunken moon eyes.  This I should like 
best”—thus the seduced seduces himself—“to love the earth as the 
moon loves her, and to touch her beauty only with my eyes.  And this 
is what the immaculate perception of all things shall mean to me: that 
I want nothing from them, except to be allowed to lie prostrate before 
them like a mirror with a hundred eyes.”44 
 
This kind of perception, Nietzsche argues, is a fiction, for it denies the intimate 
connection between the perceiver and the world, and is therefore abstract and 
incomplete.  We do not merely look upon the world; rather, we are invested in it.  
We are caught up in the world, bound to it by our desire, our will—our bodies. 45  
We and the world are mutually implicated in the act of perception, and therefore 
our understanding of perception must take this mutual implication into account.  
We must recognize the intimate connection between perceiver and perceived, and 
we must recognize specifically that the will and desire of the perceiver inform 
every instance of perception. 
                                                 
44 TSZ, II, “On Immaculate Perception,” p. 234 
45 Nietzsche makes a similar point in The Gay Science: “As soon as we see a new image, we immediately construct 
it with the aid of all our previous experiences, depending on the degree of our honesty and justice.  All experiences 
are moral experiences, even in the realm of sense perception” (§114, pp. 173-4). 
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The mistake of the higher men is that they attempt to listen to Zarathustra’s 
words as if they were mere signs to be deciphered, internalized, and expressed 
again.  What is necessary is not a detached, cognitive mode of listening, but rather 
an engaged—and what we can describe, although perhaps imperfectly, as a 
bodily—form of listening.  The higher men, if they are ever to appreciate the 
fullness of Zarathustra’s teaching, must surrender themselves to the full experience 
of Zarathustra’s speeches.  They must make themselves vulnerable in order to 
prepare themselves for the power of Zarathustra’s doctrine.  Such hearing cannot 
be a process of detached contemplation predicated upon an external relation 
between speaker, sign, and listener.  The higher men cannot simply open their ears 
in preparation to receive the activity of Zarathustra’s teaching (in the way that the 
reveler in The Birth of Tragedy prepares herself to receive passively the activity of 
the Dionysian life force); rather they must learn to attune their entire bodies that 
they might grasp the deeper meaning of Zarathustra’s teaching.  But, of course, 
they have not done so.  They have tried simply to decipher and enact the literal 
meaning of Zarathustra’s words, and they have failed to embody the truth of his 
teaching.  Hence, Zarathustra concludes, “the heedful ear is lacking in their 
limbs.”46 
 In their inability to listen to Zarathustra in the proper manner, the higher 
men betray the inadequacy of their mode of affectivity.  What is required is 
precisely a bodily affectivity which is attuned to life and to the earth, in order that 
the movement and activity of life and earth might be perceived.  At this point, it 
will likely come as little surprise to my reader when I suggest that the dancer 
typifies the mode of affectivity required by Zarathustra’s teaching.  Indeed 
Zarathustra pronounces explicitly the superiority of the dancer over the higher 
men: “You higher men, the worst about you is that all of you have not learned to 
dance as one must dance—dancing away over yourselves!”47  The dancer “has his 
ear in his toes.”  That is, the dancer—as both described and exemplified by 
Zarathustra—recognizes the intimacy by which he is bound to life and earth, and 
his body is willfully attuned to receive their teaching.  Therefore the dancer’s 
bodily affectivity is more properly suited to receive the full import of Zarathustra’s 
teachings than the higher men’s detached listening could ever be. 
 
V. Conclusion:  Introductory Remarks on the Will to Power of the Dancer 
 The agency and affectivity which I have identified as constitutive of the 
“dancer’s virtue” extolled by Zarathustra represent the new form which human life 
must take in light of Nietzsche’s (and Zarathustra’s) epiphany of the eternal 
                                                 
46 TSZ.IV, “The Sign,” p. 437 
47 TSZ.IV, “On the Higher Man,” §20, p. 407 
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recurrence.  Given that what I am suggesting is a new understanding of human life, 
and given that, for Nietzsche, “life” must be understood in terms of the highly 
complicated notion of the “will to power,” I would be remiss if I did not attempt to 
consider the dancer as an expression of the will to power.  While the scope of this 
paper will not permit the kind of extensive discussion which would be necessary in 
order to give a full treatment of the will to power, we can at the very least give a 
preliminary indication of the dancer’s relationship to this crucial Nietzschean 
concept.  Indeed, even a brief discussion will reveal in the agency and affectivity 
of the dancer a mode of life which expresses the will to power in its fullest form. 
 The will to power, Nietzsche writes in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, is “the 
unexhausted procreative will of life.”48  It is the will of life to go beyond itself, to 
create beyond itself.  As his readers know quite well, Nietzsche’s descriptions of 
the will to power are often violent and tend to highlight its destructive aspect, and 
this is true indeed of many of the appearances of the will to power in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra.  Note for example Zarathustra’s remarks that “life itself requires 
hostility,” 49  that “all creators are hard,” 50  and that “the lion-will wants 
itself…hungry, violent, lonely, godless.”51  However, as Zarathustra points out, the 
will to power—as the fundamental expression of life—is not only destructive and 
creative, but also possesses a yielding character, or what I have described as an 
“affectivity.” 52  For as Zarathustra says, “even the strongest yields.”  Life cannot 
be wholly destructive and aggressive; for indeed life must overcome itself.  In 
order to overcome itself—to “climb over itself climbing”53—life must yield to the 
eternal movement of becoming.  Indeed the very movement of overcoming 
requires that life itself submit to its own overcoming, or in other words, that it 
willfully enter into its own surpassing in the eternal recurrence. 
                                                 
48 TSZ.II, “On Self-Overcoming,” p. 226 
49 TSZ.II, “On the Rabble,” p. 209 
50 TSZ.II, “On the Pitying,” p. 202 
51 TSZ.II, “On the Famous Wise Men,” p. 215 
52 In his essay on the will to power, Alphonso Lingis addresses the affectivity which is inherent in Nietzsche’s 
conceptions of both will and power: “affectivity is contained in the Nietzschean concept of will, and power is 
measured by feeling rather than by the sovereignty of self-consciousness.  Before Nietzsche had yet introduced his 
concept of Will to Power, he spoke of feeling of power; power was taken to be a matter of feeling rather than of will.  
But the final Nietzschean term ‘will’ does not merely replace, it incorporates that dimension of feeling; for 
Nietzsche, power—being not a solitary upsurge in being, but a differential element in a field of force—is essentially 
affective” (p. 51).  Lingis’s point here is that the very notions of “will” and “power”—and consequently of “will to 
power”—contain within themselves an essential element of sensitivity.  Another valuable discussion of the 
affectivity of the will to power is to be found in Deleuze (1977).  “Inferior forces (as distinct from those that 
command) do not cease being forces even though they obey.  To obey is a quality of force as such, and it is just as 
much tied to power as commanding is” (p. 81).  “Will to Power belongs to the reactive or dominated force just as 
well as to the active or dominating force” (p. 90).  See also Deleuze’s analysis of the complicated relationship 
between the will to power and the eternal recurrence, in the same essay. 
53 TSZ.II, “On the Tarantulas,” p. 213 
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 From even this cursory discussion of the will to power, we can see quite 
clearly that the Zarathustrian dancer who is characterized by her specific modes of 
agency and affectivity exhibits the key features of the will to power—both in its 
active (i.e. creative) and yielding capacities.  Although it is beyond the scope of 
this project to do so at any length, I would like at least to suggest provisionally that 
the three metamorphoses, which I earlier characterized as corresponding to the 
affectivity and agency of the dancer, can also be understood as an expression of the 
yielding (camel), destructive (lion), and creative (child) aspects of the will to 
power.  Thus when the dancer senses—through her bodily affectivity—the 
movement and activity of life and earth, and when she thrusts against the weight of 
the earth and leaps into the air—in an act of creative agency—she also expresses, 
in a precisely bodily way, the will to power. 
As Zarathustra teaches, the highest human virtue—“what is great” and “what 
can be loved in man”54—is that the human being is a creature which overcomes 
itself in its very act of going under.  In other words, “man” has a unique potential 
for virtue inasmuch as his most noble life-activity requires that he submit to the 
eternal movement of becoming which is life itself.  Indeed, I suggest that “virtue” 
for Zarathustra is precisely the union in the will of self-overcoming and going-
under, and that the dancer exemplifies human virtue precisely in her embodiment 
of these two characteristics.  Zarathustra the dancer attunes his body to life and 
earth, senses their movements, and models his own activity after that which his 
body has perceived.  Zarathustra has received the thought of the eternal recurrence; 
he has perceived the cyclical movement—the “fleeing and returning” of life and 
earth, and his virtue lies in his willful submission to that movement in becoming. 
 
 
“We should consider every day lost on which we have not danced at least once.” 
TSZ.III, “On Old and New Tablets,” §23, p. 322 
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